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Introduction
The international aspects of the United States insurance industry stem
from the business of reinsurance-the process by which domestic insurers
protect their insurance risks by buying insurance for those risks from inter-
national insurers.1 Although many American companies provide reinsur-
ance, foreign companies receive a large portion of U.S. reinsurance
premiums.2 Given the magnitude of business between domestic and inter-
national insurers, it is important for the United States to monitor foreign
reinsurers for any potential antitrust activity abroad that may increase the
cost of reinsurance coverage and adversely affect U.S. insurers and
consumers.
In theory, the international insurance industry is vulnerable to anti-
trust activity because of the nature of its business.3 Any anticompetitive
* J.D. Candidate, 1994, Cornell Law School; BA., 1990, Columbia University.
1. The process of insuring against reinsurance risks is called retrocessional insur-
ance. Ruth Gastel, Reinsurance, INsURANcE INFoRMATION INsTTUTrE REPORis, Jan. 1993,
Nexis Library, IIRPTS file.
2. Reinsurance involves more than 1,770 foreign reinsurers from 78 countries
doing business with U.S. insurers. Id. The Reinsurance Association of America (RAA)
reports that approximately 35% of U.S. reinsurance premiums go to foreign reinsurers
and that U.S. insurers paid $6.83 billion in property/casualty premiums to foreign rein-
surers in 1990. Id.
3. For a theoretical discussion of the elements of necessary collusion, see George
A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L REV. 439, 451-57
(1982). Generally, large-scale reinsurance risks are costly and usually require large
companies such as Lloyd's of London with sufficient capital to underwrite these massive
risks. Without proper regulation, these large companies may eliminate smaller ones
with insufficient capital to compete in the market and provide alternative coverage.
Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Antitnust Law: The McCarran-Ferguson Ad and Beyond, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 81, 83 (1983). In addition, since insurance companies tend to
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activity by insurers can potentially produce harmful effects on U.S. con-
sumers and the U.S. economy.4 Collusion among insurers results in the
"unavailability and unaffordability" of property-casualty insurance which
has characterized the recent "crisis" in the United States insurance mar-
ket.5 For example, the U.S. market currently lacks environmental pollu-
tion coverage as well as certain policies insuring local government against
private suits for failure to supply basic public health services such as police
protection and roadway maintenance.6 In the insurance crisis of the mid-
1980s "municipal swimming pools and skating rinks were closed, parades
canceled, and police and fire vehicles idled" because cities could not find
or afford coverage. 7 These restrictions on the insurance trade forced con-
sumers to bear the high costs of tort liability without any insurance
protection.8
Responding to this insurance crisis, various states investigated the
matter and eventually filed suit in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California against
both domestic and foreign insurers and reinsurers, alleging that these
defendants had agreed to boycott various insurance policies in violation of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.9 From its inception, commentators empha-
sized the importance of the Hartford case because of its potential to disrupt
the way in which domestic and foreign insurers conduct their business. 10
The case presented the U.S. Supreme Court with an opportunity to resolve
two important legal issues with important ramifications for the interna-
tional insurance industry. The first issue involved the scope of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act which immunizes the insurance industry from federal
antitrust laws. The Court considered whether domestic insurers lose their
immunity under the Act when they transact business with foreign reinsur-
ers. The Court also redefined the types of activities that constitute an
unlawful boycott and nullify McCarran-Ferguson antitrust immunity.
The second issue facing the Court involved the application of U.S.
antitrust laws to foreign entities. Individual states have traditionally regu-
lated the insurance industry." These states, however, may be unable to
regulate foreign reinsurers whose alleged antitrust activity occurs outside
their territorial boundaries. Despite jurisdictional problems, the United
share statistical data about future insurance risks, such activity, if left unregulated, can
result in price-fixing that does not reflect free market principles.
4. Richard N. Clarke et al., Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Economic
Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367 (1988).
5. Jay Angoff, Insurance Against Competition: How the McCarran-Ferguson Act Raises
Prices and Profits in the Prperty-Casua Insurance Industy, 5 YALEJ. ON REG. 397 (1988).
6. Clarke et al., supra note 4, at 368 (citing Businesses Struggling To Adapt As Insur-
ance Crisis Spreads, WAL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1986, at 31).
7. Gail Diane Cox, No Insurance Conspiracy Found, States' Antitrust Suits Questioned,
NAT'L LJ., Aug. 14, 1989, at 3.
8. Linda Greenhouse, High Court To Resolve Unclaimed-Funds Feud, N.Y. TiMm, Oct.
6, 1992, at D2.
9. 113 S. Ct. 289 (1993).
10. Henry Gottlieb, New Jersey AG to Argue Crucial Insurance Antitrust Case, CONN. L.
TRm., Feb. 1, 1993, at 10.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012-1015 (1988).
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States has applied federal antitrust laws to foreign companies in many of
these situations.' 2 In Hartford, the Court endorsed a comity balancing test
for determining when extraterritorial jurisdiction is appropriate.'8
This Note discusses the background of the U.S. insurance industry's
exemption from federal antitrust laws under the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
as well as the international comity factors courts consider in deciding
when to apply U.S. antitrust laws extraterritorially. Next, this Note ana-
lyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Hartford and considers its future
effect on international insurers. Finally, this Note sets forth two argu-
ments. First, the Supreme Court, in deciding Hartford, should have nar-
rowed the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act by denying foreign
reinsurers its protection under section 2(b) and expanding the definition
of the term "boycott" under section 3(b) of the Act. Second, the Court
should have rejected the international comity balancing test for determin-
ing jurisdiction as non-justiciable and applied, instead, a pure "effects"
standard.
1. Background
A. The McCarran-Ferguson Act
In 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act in response to oppo-
sition by the insurance industry to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'nY4 In that case, the Supreme Court determined that insurance fell
within the Commerce Clause and was therefore subject to federal antitrust
laws.15 The possibility of federal antitrust suits against the insurance
industry heightened the controversy engendered during the New Deal era
over the expansion of federal power and its interference with state sover-
eignty.16 In response, insurers lobbied in support of retaining state taxa-
tion and regulation of the industry.17 As a result, Congress passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, intending that the states retain their traditional
power of regulating the insurance business.18 An additional purpose of
the Act was to protect from antitrust laws the industry's cooperative
12. See Harold R. Schmidt, The Extratenitorial Application of the United States Antitrust
Laws, 5 J.L. & COM. 321 (1985).
13. See discussion infra parts ME, 1I.C.
14. 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (overruling the Court's prior decision in Paul v. Virginia,
75 U.S. 168 (1868) (holding that insurance was not within the Commerce Clause)).
15. Id. at 553.
16. Kevin Thompson, McCarran-Ferguson Repeal and ISO'S Advisoy Rate Ban: A
Chance for Compromise?, 17 N. Ky. L. REv. 373, 376 (1990). For a detailed discussion of
the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see Charles D. Weller, The McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, Histoy & Policy, 1978 DuxE
L.J. 587.
17. Thompson, supra note 16, at 376.
18. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988)). Section 1 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act states:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that
silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to
the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
Cornell International Law Journal
ratemaking efforts, which are regulated by state agencies and considered
necessary for the efficient underwriting of risks.19 Congress did not
intend, however, for the McCarran-Ferguson Act to foreclose all antitrust
scrutiny.20 Instead, federal antitrust laws including the Sherman Antitrust
Act,21 the Clayton Act,22 and the Federal Trade Commission Act23 apply
when insurers engage in acts of "boycott, coercion, or intimidation" under
Section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Thus, to qualify for McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act immunity from federal antitrust laws, the insurer must
satisfy the following three criteria:
(1) the defendant insurers must be in the "business of insurance";24
and
(2) the state must regulate that business;25 and
(3) the defendant insurers must not engage in acts of "boycott, coer-
cion, or intimidation."26
As the following sections reveal, the meaning of these three criteria have
been the subject of considerable judicial attention.
Id. § 1011.
Section 2 of the Act states:
Regulation by State law, Federal law relating specifically to insurance; applica-
bility of certain Federal laws afterJune 30, 1948
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the busi-
ness of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That
after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the
Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1941, as amended, known as the
Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal
Trade Commission Act, as amended [15 U.S.C. et seq.], shall be applicable
to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regu-
lated by State law.
Id. § 1012.
Section 3(b) of the Act states: "Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the
said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or
act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation." Id. § 1013(b).
19. Julia M. Melendez, The McCarran-Feguson Act: Has It Outlived Its Intent?, 42 FW'N
INs. & Cor. CouNs. Q. 283, 287 (1992) (citing Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal
Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 221 (1982)); Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119,
129 (1982).
20. "Both the language of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and the Act's legislative his-
tory, make clear that the purpose of the insurance immunity was to permit state regula-
tory mechanisms to function without federal intervention, and not to give broad license
to operate without antitrust scrutiny." Edward 0. Correia, The Antitrust Laws and Insur-
ance: Applying Federal Policy To A State-Regulated Industy, 26 ToRT & INs. L.J. 813, 818
(1991) (citing Report of the Commission for the Review of the Antitrust Laws, 897
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 232 (Spec. Supp., Jan. 18, 1979)).
21. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1988).
22. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1988).
23. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1988).
24. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a).
25. Id. § 1012(b).
26. Id. § 1013(b).
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1. The Business of Insurance
McCarran-Ferguson antitrust immunity depends on whether the chal-
lenged conduct is part of the "business of insurance."27 In recent cases,
the Supreme Court has narrowly construed this phrase.2 8 In SEC v.
National Sec., Inc.,2 9 the Supreme Court limited the "business of insurance"
to activity affecting the relationship between the insurer and the insured
as distinguished from the general corporate practices of insurance compa-
nies.30 In addition to the relationship between the insurer and the
insured, the Court determined in Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug
Co.3 1 that two other types of activity-risk underwriting and cooperative
rate-making--also constitute the "business of insurance." The Court most
recently narrowed the definition of the "business of insurance" in Union
Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno by asserting that these three factors (the rela-
tionship between the insurer and the insured, the underwriting of risks,
and cooperative rate-making) are exhaustive in determining whether an
insurer's activity is immune from federal antitrust laws.3 2
2. State Regulation of the Insurance Business
In addition to the "business of insurance" requirement, the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act requires that states regulate the insurance business if insurers
are to receive immunity from federal antitrust laws.33 However, the courts
generally avoid reviewing the effectiveness of state regulation.3 4 For exam-
ple, in FTC v. National Casualty Co.,35 the Supreme Court rejected the Fed-
eral Trade Commission's attempt to justify federal regulation of the
respondent's advertising practices on the grounds that state regulation was
insufficient 6 In effect, the McCarran-Ferguson Act immunizes insurers
so long as states satisfy a minimum standard of regulation described by the
Ninth Circuit in Feinstein v. Nettleship Co.,3 7 as "a state regulatory scheme
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). See also Peter Gilett, The Business of Insurance: Exemption,
Exemption, Who Has the Antitrust Exemption, 17 PAc. LJ. 261 (1985).
28. Stanley K. Yamada, Jr., Group Life & Helath Ins. v. Royal Drug Co.: The Narrowing
Exemption of the Business of Insurance From Federal Antitrust Scrutiny, 7 PEPP. L. REv. 763,
768 (1980).
29. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
30. Id. at 460.
31. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
32. 458 U.S. 119 (1982). See also T. Richard Kennedy, The McCarran Act: A Limited
"Business of Insurance" Antitrust Exemption Made Even Narrower-Three Recent Decisions, 18
F. 528, 533 (1983).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
34. Timothy H. Hiebert, The State Regulation Requirement Under Section 2(b) of the
McCarran-Fergson Ac 53 INs. CouNs.J. 234 (1986) (Section 2(b) is satisfied when states
deliberately authorize insurers' conduct).
35. 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
36. Id. at 564. Cf Linda M. Lent, McCarran-Ferguson In Perspectiv 48 INs. CouNs.J.
411, 426 (1981) (interpreting § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act as codifying the
higher regulatory standard of the state action doctrine).
37. 714 F.2d 928, (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984).
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possess[ing] jurisdiction over the challenged practice."3 8 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court in FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n.3 9 defined state regula-
tion as "regulation by the State where the business activities have their
operative force."4° Each state must therefore regulate internally the
effects of insurance activity occurring outside its borders.
3. The "Boycott, Coercion, or Intimidation" Exception to the McCarran-
Ferguson Act
Section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act prohibits antitrust immunity
when the insurers' activity constitutes "any agreement to boycott, coerce,
or intimidate or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation."41 In St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry,42 the Supreme Court interpreted the term
"boycott" expansively to include not only restrictive activity among com-
peting insurers, but also restrictive actions taken by any person, including
consumers of insurance services. The Court determined that the term
"boycott" reflects "a tradition of meaning, as elaborated in the body of
decisions interpreting the Sherman Act."43
Recognizing, however, that Congress intended to protect certain
activities of insurers such as cooperative rate-making that might otherwise
qualify as a "boycott" under the traditional definition, the Court conceded
that not "all concerted activity violative of the Sherman Act comes within
§ 3(b)" of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.44 Instead, the Court emphasized,
"we are not citing to any decisions illustrating the assertion that price-fix-
ing, in the absence of any additional enforcement activity, has been
treated either as a 'boycott' or 'coercion.'" 45 Thus, the Court suggested
that proof of enforcement activity could cause some concerted activity pro-
tected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act to fall within the boycott exception,
thereby voiding immunity.
The Supreme Court's discussion of enforcement activity in Barry is
consistent with the Court's reasoning in the landmark case of United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n.,4 6 which triggered the passage of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act 47 South-Eastern involved rate-setting and monop-
olization by the South-Eastern Underwriters Association (SEUA), com-
posed of two-hundred member companies and twenty-seven individuals,
38. Id. at 933. Cf FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992) (imposing a
higher regulatory standard under the state action doctrine).
39. 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
40. Id. at 301-02.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b).
42. 438 U.S. 531 (1978). Rhode Island physicians and patients sued four medical
malpractice insurers alleging that three of the four insurers had refused to deal at all
with the policyholders of the fourth causing the policyholders to comply with new rules
establishing coverage on a "claims made" basis rather than the old, "occurrence" basis.
Id. at 533.
43. Id. at 541.
44. Id. at 555.
45. I& at 559 n.6.
46. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
47. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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all of whom refused to deal with non-member insurance companies and
forced persons who needed insurance to buy only from SEUA members
and only on SEUA terms.4 8 The Court found that the coercive activity of
SEUA members enforced the boycott by compelling non-member insur-
ance companies to comply with SEUA terms for the sale of insurance.49
B. The Crisis in the Insurance Industry and the Current Debate Over
the McCarran-Ferguson Act
The insurance industry is unique in its exemption from federal antitrust
laws under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.50 Whether or not this broad
exemption is justified has been the topic of recent debate inspired by the
mid-1980's crisis in the insurance industry.5 1 In fact, Hartford arose against
the backdrop of this insurance crisis. Among the explanations offered for
the shortage in insurance coverage resulting from the crisis are such sys-
temic defects as collusion among insurers, imprudent business practices of
insurers, inadequate state regulation, and changes in the tort system of
liability.5 2
Additionally, scholars, consumer advocates, and some business groups
argue that the McCarran-Ferguson Act itself causes the cyclical crises in
the insurance industry by granting insurers overly broad immunity from
antitrust laws.5 3 In response, these groups recently lobbied for an amend-
ment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. A Bill (called the Insurance Compet-
itive Pricing Act of 1993) to modify the antitrust exemption currently
exists in both the House of Representatives and the Senate of the United
States.54 The Bill proposes three new changes. First, the Bill defines cer-
tain harmful activities such as price-fixing, monopolization, allocation of
territories among market competitors, and unlawful tying practices to
which the federal antitrust laws will apply.55 Second, the Bill defines cer-
tain "safe harbors" of activity such as sharing "'historical loss' statistics and
'loss development' data" to which the current McCarran-Ferguson anti-
trust exemption will continue to apply.5 6 Lastly, the Bill provides a "transi-
tional 'phase-out' of the antitrust exemption for joint 'trending'
activity."57 Although Congress has not yet acted on these amendments,
Anne K Bingamnan, Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division of
48. Id. at 534-35.
49. Id. at 535-36.
50. Thomas H. Sear, Antitrust Questions for Insurers, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 15, 1993, at 2.
51. Geoffrey P. Miller, The Insurance Industy's Antitrust Exemption: A Long-Standing
Tradition Faces Its Greatest Cha!enge, ABA PREvIEW oF UNrrED STATES SuPREM COURT
CASES, Feb. 5, 1993. For opposing views in the debate over the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
compare Correia, supra note 20 (supporting reform of the Act) with Melendez, supra
note 19 (opposing reform of the Act).
52. Miller, supra note 51.
53. Angoff, supra note 5.
54. The Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1993, H.R. 9, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); S. 84, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
55. H.R. REP. No. 1036, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1992).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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the Department of Justice, recently expressed her support for amending
the Act "so as to narrow the scope of the antitrust immunity that it affords
to the business of insurance."5 8
Proponents of repealing the McCarran-Ferguson Act claim that the
statute is obsolete because the circumstances of its enactment have
changed.59 First, Congress originally passed the Act under the highly
politicized conditions of the New Deal Era, a time in which the states
feared that the interventionist federal government would preempt the
states' traditional power to tax and regulate the industry.60 Today, an
understanding that the U.S. government functions best by sharingjurisdic-
tion mitigates the conflict between state and federal control.61 Second,
the insurance industry is no longer a nascent industry dominated by a few
large firms and in need of special protection from antitrust laws. Instead,
today many firms of different sizes compete freely within the industry pro-
viding a diverse array of insurance coverage.6 2 Third, federal regulation
of the insurance industry would promote uniformity and efficiency by sup-
planting the widely inconsistent state regulatory schemes. 63
Furthermore, even if Congress repealed or modified the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, some insurance activity could continue to be exempt from
federal antitrust laws under the state action doctrine. This doctrine
exempts anticompetitive activity from federal antitrust laws where the state
clearly intends to permit such activity and actively supervises it.64 Thus,
states could protect any anticompetitive conduct of insurers that they
58. Anne K. Bingaman, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Economic and
Commercial Law and Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives
Concerning Legislation to Amend the Antitrust Exemption Provided By the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 1 (July 29, 1993) (transcript available from the Department of Justice).
59. Gilett, supra note 27, at 277.
60. For a discussion of the McCarran-Ferguson Act as a proper means of allocating
regulatory power over the insurance industry between the federal government and the
states, see Spencer L. Kimball & Barbara P. Heaney, Emasculation of the McCarran-Fegu-
son Act: A Study in Judicial Activism, 1985 UTAH L. REv. 1, 32-38.
61. Id.
62. Eric N. Berg, Insurers Brace forDebate On How Industry Operates, N.Y. TMES, July 2,
1990, at DI (citing the multitude of insurers--"nearly 1,500 underwriters nationwide in
the property-casualty business alone"-as evidence that the industry is "brutally compet-
itive."). Opponents of the Act, however, use the same evidence as proof that "a truly
competitive market could not sustain such a large number of players." Id. Supporters
of the Act, on the other hand, claim that its repeal would force small insurers to merge
with larger ones to remain competitive, thereby decreasing overall competition in the
industry. Id.
63. Melendez, supra note 19, at 305.
64. See generally M. Shawn McMurray, The Perils ofJudicial Legislation: The Establish-
ment and Evolution of the Parkerv. BrownExemption to the Sherman Antitrust Act, 20 N. Ky. L
REv. 249 (1992) (explaining state action doctrine asjudicial legislation unsupported by
the language of the Sherman Act); W. Scott Campbell, Antitrust Immunity: The State of
"State Action," 88 W. VA. L REv. 783 (1986) (expansion of state action doctrine to
municipal governments threatens federalist principles); Milton Handler, Reforming the
Antitrust Laws, 82 CoLuM. L. REv. 1287, 1330-38 (1982) ("The state action doctrine
should be based on preemption and not exemption principles .... ").
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deem necessary, so long as they actively regulate such activity.65
C. International Comity
International comity refers to principles of courtesy and respect expressed
in the willingness of one nation to grant a privilege to another nation
(such as applying foreign laws to a domestic dispute involving foreign enti-
ties), not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will. 66 The
practical value of international comity is that it permits the courts of one
nation to give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another nation.67 In
an increasingly interconnected global economy where activity that occurs
within the boundaries of one nation may very likely have an economic
affect on other nations, the principle of comity becomes very important.68
The United States confronts issues of international comity when it applies
its federal antitrust laws extraterritorially. This section of the Note
describes the judicial development of a balancing test for determining
whether international comity should bar the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust laws.
1. Judicial Precedent
In American Banana Co., v. United Fruit Co., the U.S. Supreme Court deter-
mined that the Sherman Act did not apply to antitrust activity occurring
outside the United States. 69 According to Justice Holmes, "the general
and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlaw-
ful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done."70 The Supreme Court did not consider, however, whether the out-
come would differ if the alleged antitrust activity affected U.S. trade. The
Second Circuit addressed this issue in a later case, United States v. Alumi-
num Company of America (Alcoa),7 ' in which the court decided that the
65. For an analysis of the state action doctrine as applied to title insurance compa-
nies, see FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992) (state action immunity not
available under the "negative options" regulatory scheme of two states).
66. BrAcK's LAw DiarioNARY 267 (6th ed. 1990). For a theoretical discussion of
international comity, see Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1
(1991).
67. BLAc 's LAw DiroNARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
68. Recognizing the need to respect the antitrust laws of other nations, on Septem-
ber 23, 1992, Attorney General William P. Barr, FTC Chairman Janet D. Steiger, and
European Community Competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan signed an agree-
ment to promote cooperation and coordination in antitrust enforcement between the
United States and the Commission of the European Communities. Alden F. Abbott,
The Commerce Department Speaks 1992: Developments in Import Administration; Export and
Investment Abroad, in CORPORATE LAw AND PRACCE COURSE HANDBooK SERuEs, Oct. 1-2,
1992.
69. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). American
Banana alleged that the United Fruit Company incited Costa Rican soldiers to destroy
American Banana's plantation as part of a plot to monopolize and restrain banana
imports from Central America into the United States 1d. at 354.
70. Id. at 356.
71. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The
United States challenged the antitrust activity of Alcoa's Canadian subsidiary, Alumi-
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Sherman Act applied to antitrust activity occurring abroad so long as such
anticompetitive conduct was "intended to affect imports and did affect
them."72 Thus, the court in Alcoa developed the "effects test" of subject
matter jurisdiction.73
Commentators have criticized the effects test because it does not spec-
ify how much effect on U.S. commerce is sufficient to warrant the extrater-
ritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws.74 Foreign nations have criticized
the effects test as "a wholesale exportation of U.S. competition policy"
which ignores "the policies and concerns of foreign governments." 75 In
fact, the United States did not consider the interests of foreign nations
before applying antitrust laws to foreign entities until the Ninth and Third
Circuit courts decided Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America (Timberlane
1)76 and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,77 respectively. In these
two cases, the Ninth and Third Circuits incorporated international comity
factors into the Alcoa "intended effects test" for the first time.
In the Ninth Circuit case of Timberlane I, Judge Choy criticized the
"effects test" as being "by itself... incomplete because it fails to consider
other nations' interests."7 8 He proposed, in the alternative, a three-part
test which included international comity considerations. 7 9 The Ninth Cir-
cuit recommended that the district court weigh the following factors in
determining whether international comity bars the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. antitrust laws:
[T]he degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or alle-
giance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of
corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be
expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of the effects on
num Limited, which formed a cartel with European aluminum producers that
restricted trade with the United States. Id. at 421.
72. Id. at 444.
73. Id.
74. "[I]n application there has been wide disparity in the case law as to the substanti-
ality of the effects on American commerce required before jurisdiction may be
asserted." Schmidt, supra note 12, at 330.
75. Joong Sik Shin, ExtratenitorialApplication of U.S. Antitrust Law, 25 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 177, 181 (1990).
76. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America (Timberlane I), 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976) remanded, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (Timberlane II), af/'d, 749 F.2d
1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
77. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
78. Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 611-12.
79. Judge Choy's three part test states:
[T] he antitrust laws require in the first instance that there be some effect-actual
or intended-on American foreign commerce before the federal courts may
legitimately exercise subject matterjurisdiction under those statutes. Second, a
greater showing of burden or restraint may be necessary to demonstrate that
the effect is sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and,
therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust laws.... Third, there is the additional
question which is unique to the international setting of whether the interests of,
and links to, the United States-including the magnitude of the effect on
American foreign commerce-are sufficiently strong, vis-a-vis those of other
nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.
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the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which
there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foresee-
ability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged
of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
8 0
In balancing these factors, the district court determined on remand in
Timberlane H that the United States should not exercisejurisdicion.8 1 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the antitrust suit
because the balancing test favored abstention.8 2
Whereas the simple "effects test" permitted the exercise of jurisdic-
tion even when the effect of antitrust activity on U.S. trade was minimal,
the new Timberlane test introduced the "concept of abstention" which
restrained U.S. courts from exercising jurisdiction by showing deference
to foreign interests where appropriate.8 3 This concept of abstention is
also known as the "jurisdictional rule of reason" because it permits the
courts to determine on a case by case basis whether application of U.S.
antitrust laws to foreign entities (in light of foreign interests) is reasonable
under the circumstances.8 4
In Mannington Mills8 5 the Third Circuit interpreted the Timberlane I
comity factors as being relevant in determining whether the court should
abstain from exercising jurisdiction, not in determining whether subject
matter jurisdiction exists in the first place.8 6 Thus, after finding in Man-
nington Mills that jurisdiction existed because the foreign antitrust activity
Id. at 613 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 614.
81. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America (Timberlane II), 574F. Supp. 1453
(N.D. Cal. 1983), aft'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
The plaintiffs in Timberlane were an Oregon partnership which purchased lumber
through two of its subsidiaries located in Honduras and sold the lumber in the United
States. 749 F.2d at 1380. The plaintiff; alleged that defendants interfered with their
operations in Honduras by attaching plaintiffs' property in a judicial proceeding with
the intent of preventing plaintiffs from milling lumber so as to create a competitive
advantage for the defendants. Id.
82. The Ninth Circuit reasoned:
[A]II but two of the factors in Timberlane !'s comity analysis indicate that we
should refuse to exercise jurisdiction over this antitrust case. The potential for
conflict with Honduran economic policy and commercial law is great. The
effect on the foreign commerce of the United States is minimal. The evidence
of intent to harm American commerce is altogether lacking. The foreseeability
of the anticompetitive consequences of the allegedly illegal actions is slight.
Most of the conduct that must be examined occurred abroad. The factors that
favor jurisdiction are the citizenship of the parties and, to a slight extent, the
enforcement effectiveness of United States law. We do not believe that this is
enough to justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction over this case.
Id. at 1386.
83. Steven A. Kadish, Comity and the International Application of the Sherman Act:
Encouraging the Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 4 Nw. J. IrNr'L L. & Bus. 130, 14245
(1982).
84. Id. at 154.
85. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
86. "Therefore, under the Third Circuit's view, even though subject matterjursdic-
tion is found to exist, international comity factors must be weighed in deciding whether
to exercise such jurisdiction." Shin, supra note 75, at 184-85.
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harmed the U.S. export business, the Third Circuit considered the follow-
ing factors (which are very similar to those specified in Timberlane 1) to
decide if it should exercise jurisdiction:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared
to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its
foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction
and grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of
being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under
conflicting requirements by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made
by the foreign nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.87
The Third Circuit further developed the "concept of abstention" discussed
in Timberlane It by allowing the lower courts to refuse to apply U.S. anti-
trust laws extraterritorially even when U.S. jurisdiction over subject matter
exists. Thus, the Mannington Mills test "functions as a self-imposed
restraint on the court's finding of antitrust extraterritorial jurisdiction to
avoid unnecessary international conflicts."8 8 Timberlane 11, in contrast,
considers the comity factors as part of a single test for determining
whether jurisdiction exists in the first place.8 9
Although the Third and Ninth Circuits have devised an international
comity balancing test for purposes of determining when to exercise juris-
diction over foreign entities, other circuits have rejected this elaborate
analysis. In the case of In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation (Uranium Antitrust
1)90 the district court found the Timberlane analysis "unworkable" in bal-
ancing the competing domestic and international interests and instead
relied on the Alcoa effects test.91 On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh
Circuit agreed with the district court that the Timberlane Iand Mannington
Mills cases did not provide binding precedent.92 Similarly, in Laker Air-
87. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir.
1979).
88. Shin, supra note 75, at 186.
89. 749 F.2d at 1382-83.
90. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Westing-
house Electric Corporation sued 29 defendants including foreign producers from Can-
ada, Britain, Australia, and South Africa for forming a cartel which raised the price of
uranium sold on the international market so high that Westinghouse could not afford
to buy uranium to satisfy its contractual obligations. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation,
473 F. Supp. 382, 384-85 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
91. 480 F. Supp. at 1148.
92. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). The court
distinguished the Timberlane and Mannington Mills decisions because in those cases the
defendants appeared and contested jurisdiction, whereas in the Uranium Antitrust case,
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ways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways the D.C. Circuit rejected a comity
analysis as "useless in allocating jurisdiction when concurrent jurisdiction
exists between different nations."93 Thus, some circuits have not adopted
the comity balancing test and continue to rely on the effects doctrine.
2. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
Congress responded to the "inherent tensions between considerations of
jurisdiction and considerations of comity" by passing the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act (FrAIA).9 4 The FTAIA amends the Sherman
Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act by providing that those Acts
do not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign nations
unless that conduct has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect" on commerce within the United States.95 This standard provides a
'Jurisdictional threshold that must be crossed before comity considera-
the defendants failed to appear and, therefore, incurred a default judgment. Id. at
1255.
93. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). Laker Airways sued the members of the International Air Transport Associa-
tion (IATA) for conspiring to set unreasonably low rates for transatlantic flights,
thereby causing Laker Airways to liquidate its business. I. at 916-17. Laker Airways
sued foreign airlines including some British airlines in the United States because the
alleged activities were not illegal under British law. Id The British courts, however,
granted an injunction restraining Laker Airways from continuing its suit against the
British airlines in the United States. Id. at 918. Also, the British government prohibited
any airlines doing business in England from providing Laker Airways with documents
relevant to the suit. Id. In retaliation, the U.S. district court issued antisuit injunctions
against other foreign defendants, Sabena Belgian Airlines and KLM Royal Dutch Air-
lines, preventing them from obtaining similar relief from foreign courts. Id.
94. Schmidt, supra note 12, at 333.
95. Section 402 of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988)) provides:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or com-
merce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations
unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with for-
eign nations, or on import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or commerce with foreign nations, of a person
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7
of this title, other than this section.
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the opera-
tion of paragraph (1) (B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such
conduct only for injury to export business in the United States.
Section 403 of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 45(a) (3) (1988)) provides:
This subsection shall not apply to unfair methods of competition involving
commerce with foreign nations (other than import commerce) unless-
(A) such methods of competition have a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect-
(i) on commerce which is not commerce with foreign nations, or on
import commerce with foreign nations; or
(ii) on export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in
such commerce in the United States; and
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tions would be appropriate or necessary."9 6 Thus, the FTAIA may be
interpreted as preventing the Timberlane comity analysis from expanding
jurisdiction to foreign conduct that produces only a minimal effect on the
U.S. economy.9 7 However, Congress' intent that the FTAIA apply exclu-
sively to U.S. export transactions may limit the FTAIA's jurisdictional
reach.9 8
I. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California
Hartford has been considered one of the most important antitrust cases
since the breakup of American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) in the
1980s. 9 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, the case had been called
the 'mother of all antitrust cases," as well as a "nuclear attack on the insur-
ance industry" because of its potential to disrupt the way in which domes-
tic and foreign insurers conduct their business. 10 0 Referred to by the
lower courts as In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation,10 ' the case consolidated
two separate but related actions: (1) the suit against domestic primary
insurers and reinsurers initiated in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,
and (2) the suit against foreign reinsurers initiated in Merrett Underwrriting
Agency Management Limited v. California.102
A. Facts of the Case' 0 3
The complaints originated in the city of Lafayette, just north of San Fran-
cisco, California, in 1988 when the town could not obtain liability insur-
ance after contacting many different companies. 10 4 California and other
states began to investigate similar complaints of shortages in insurance
coverage and filed suit against various defendants for antitrust viola-
tions.10 5 Four defendants were sellers of commercial general liability
(B) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provision of this subsection,
other than this paragraph.
If this subsection applies to such methods of competition only because of the
operation of subparagraph (A) (ii), this subsection shall apply to such conduct
only for injury to export business in the United States.
96. George E. Garvey, The Foreign Trade Antitiustmprovements Act of 1981, 14 LAw &
PoL'Y INTrr'L Bus. 1, 40 (1982).
97. Id.
98. Barry E. Hawk, InternationalAntitnust Polity and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing Needfor Reassessment, 51 Foarrm~ L. Rv. 201, 219 (1982). See infra parts lI.E, III.C and
accompanying text.
99. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 10.
100. Thomas H. Sear, Antitrust QuestionsforInsurs, N.Y. LJ., Jan. 15, 1993, at 2.
101. 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989), revd 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), af/'d in
part, reu'd in part, rmnanded, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
102. 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
103. All the facts of the case described herein are allegations charged by the plaintiff
states in their complaint and taken as true by the Supreme Court in assessing the
defendants' motion to dismiss. Unless otherwise cited, all references to the facts
alleged are recorded in 113 S.Ct. 2891, 2891-2901 (1993).
104. Gottlieb, supra note 10.
105. See 113 S. Ct. at 2895 n.2 for a complete listing of the nineteen states which filed
suit.
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insurance (CGL) which protects the insured from liability to third parties
for bodily injury or property damage. 10 6 Other defendants included two
domestic trade associations: the Reinsurance Association of America
(RAA), an insurance lobbying group, and the Insurance Service Office
(ISO), an organization that collects statistical data and estimates risks for
standardized insurance policy forms that it develops and submits to state
regulatory agencies for approval.
Plaintiffs alleged that, in 1984, defendant Hartford Fire Insurance
Company (Hartford) sought to change ISO's standard "occurrences" CGL
form, which insured against occurrences of liability arising during the life
of the policy, to a "claims made" form that insured only claims made dur-
ing the life of the policy. Insurers prefer "claims made" forms because
they limit exposure to so called "long tail risks" which are claims arising
from an occurrence during the life of the policy that are reported long
after the policy period has expired. Hartford also wanted to include a
retroactive date provision in the new claims-made forms which would limit
coverage to claims made after a certain date. Additionally, Hartford
sought to change the standard CGL form's liability coverage for accidental
pollution because it exposed insurers to costly risks. Lastly, Hartford
wished to limit the legal costs of defending claims to the amount of cover-
age provided.
To achieve its goals, Hartford exerted pressure on ISO to modify its
CGL form by persuading domestic insurers and foreign reinsurers to boy-
cott the ISO form. As a result, ISO succumbed to the pressure and
changed its forms while also withdrawing its data collection for the older
forms. Without the availability of such support data, the use of the old
"occurrences" form became impractical because insurers did not have the
statistical information they need to help them assess the risk of insurance
under such policies.
Additionally, London reinsurers conspired to provide retrocessional
reinsurance only for U.S. insurers who signed a letter of intent to exclude
a seepage and pollution clause from their insurance policies. Over forty
retrocessional reinsurers at Lloyd's and the London Company Market
signed an agreement called the "Non Marine London Market Agreement
1987," which stated: "We hereby agree that we will use our best endeavors
to ensure that all U.S.A. and Canadian exposed insurance/reinsurance
business attaching on or after lstJanuary 1987 will only be written where
the original business includes a seepage and pollution exclusion clause
wherever legal and applicable."10 7 In effect, foreign reinsurers agreed to
boycott both "occurrence" form policies and "accidental pollution" insur-
ance coverage for consumers in the United States.
The plaintiff States argued that the domestic insurers lost their
McCarran-Ferguson immunity by conducting business with foreign rein-
106. Some defendants were domestic and foreign reinsurers. Among the foreign
insurers were six "London Company Market" corporations-all subsidiaries of Ameri-
can corporations.
107. In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 938 F.2d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 1991).
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surers who are not exempt under the Act.10 8 Plaintiffs further argued that
the pressure tactics used by the defendants to coerce the ISO to change its
insurance policy forms constituted a boycott in violation of section 3 (b) of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.1 9 Lastly, the plaintiffs contended that the
Court should exercise jurisdiction over the foreign reinsurers because the
comity factors favored extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws.
110
Defendants countered by claiming that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
immunizes the activities of insurers, and therefore, the fact that foreign
entities were parties to the transaction did not preclude protection under
the Act.111 Furthermore, defendants argued that their contract reflected
independent business judgments not to insure risky policies and, conse-
quently, did not constitute a boycott.112 Lastly, the foreign reinsurers
argued that foreign interests outweighed any U.S. interests in exercising
jurisdiction over them, and thus the Court should not apply U.S. antitrust
laws extraterritorially in this case.
1 18
B. Prior Proceedings
The district court dismissed the action, holding (1) that McCarran-Fergu-
son immunity applied to the domestic defendants and (2) that interna-
tional comity considerations barred the action against the foreign
reinsurers. 114 The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit, holding
that (1) McCarran-Ferguson immunity did not apply where foreign rein-
surers and insurance brokers had allegedly agreed to boycott; (2) domes-
tic insurers lost immunity when they conspired with foreign defendants;
and (3) international comity did not prevent U.S. courts from exercising
jurisdiction over British reinsurers.115
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court, on its own motion,
expanded argument time from the usual sixty to ninety minutes, under-
scoring the importance of the case.1 1 6 The Court limited its review to the
following three legal questions:
(1) Do domestic insurance companies whose conduct otherwise would be
exempt from federal antitrust law under McCarran-Ferguson Act lose that
exemption because they participate with foreign reinsurers in the business
of insurance?
(2) Do agreements among primary insurers and reinsurers on such matters
as standardized advisory insurance policy forms and terms of insurance cov-
108. Brief for Respondent States, In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 938 F.2d 919
(9th Cir. 1991) (No. 91-1111), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, USPlus File.
109. Id.
110. Brief for Respondent States (No. 91-1128), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library,
USPlus File.
111. Brief for the Petitioners (No. 91-1111), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library,
USPlus File.
112. Id.
113. Brief for the Petitioners (No. 91-1128), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library,
USPlus File.
114. In re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
115. 938 F.2d at 919.
116. Marcia Coyle, Down To Business, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 7, 1992, at 1.
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erage constitute a "boycott" outside the exemption of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act?
(3) Was the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law properly determined
in light of Supreme Court precedent and contemporary understanding of
international law when the Court of Appeals held that the district court
could apply U.S. law to the conduct of a foreign insurance market regulated
abroad?1 17
The remainder of this Note describes the Supreme Court's decision
regarding these three legal issues and analyzes its implications for the
international insurance industry.11 8
C. The State Regulation Issue in Hartford
f
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the appellate court on the issue
of state regulation by deciding that domestic reinsurers do not lose their
protection under the McCarran-Ferguson Act simply because they conduct
business with foreign reinsurers. 119 The Supreme Court strictly construed
the language of section 2 (b), which states that federal antitrust laws apply
"to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regu-
lated by state law."1 20 The Court determined that the Act immunizes
"activities" rather than "entities" under this language.121 Thus, as long as
the states regulate the activities of foreign reinsurers, then section 2(b) of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act protects such insurance activity from federal
antitrust laws.' 22
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Souter began his analysis by
defining the word "business."12 3 Although conceding that the term "busi-
ness" may mean "[a] commercial or industrial establishment or enter-
prise," he argued that "the definite article before 'business' in § 2(b)
shows that the word is not used in that sense, the phrase 'the business of
insurance' obviously not being meant to refer to a single entity."1 24
Instead, Justice Souter decided that "business" as used in section 2(b) is
most naturally read to refer to "mercantile transactions; buying and sell-
ing; [and] traffic."1 25 By focusing on the "mercantile transactions" them-
selves, instead of the actual entities conducting such transactions, the
Supreme Court provided McCarran-Ferguson immunity to domestic insur-
117. News & Analysis, Supreme Court Wl Review Insurance Case, U.S.LW. (Daily Edi-
tion) Oct. 9, 1992.
118. Since both the lower courts and the Supreme Court agreed that the activity
involved in Hartford constituted the "business of insurance," the focus of the case
became the other two criteria for determining whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act
grants immunity:. (1) state regulation of the insurance business and (2) alleged boycott
activity. 938 F.2d at 927; 113 S. Ct. at 2901.
119. 113 S. Ct. at 2892.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988).
121. Id. at 2902.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988).
123. 113 S. Ct. at 2901.
124. Id.
125. Id
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ers conducting international transactions, provided that the states regulate
such transactions.
D. The Boycott Issue in Hartford
Construing the facts of the case liberally, the Supreme Court concluded
that the complaint sufficiently alleged misconduct by the defendant insur-
ers that could potentially constitute a boycott. The Supreme Court unani-
mously affirmed the appellate court's refusal to dismiss the action and
remanded the issue for further consideration under the new definition of
boycott provided by Justice Scalia (writing for a majority of five Justices
including Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas). 126 In defining
the term "boycott," Justice Scalia relied on the historical derivation of the
word,127 meaning to "combine in refusing to hold relations of any kind"
with the target so as to punish that target for its position. 128 While
acknowledging that different kinds of boycotts exist,129 Justice Scalia dis-
tinguished between a "boycott" and a "concerted agreement to seek partic-
ular terms in particular transactions."1 30 He argued that a "concerted
agreement" is not a boycott but rather a "way of obtaining and exercising
market power by concertedly exacting terms."13 1 Such an agreement does
not coerce anyone into compliance but rather declares that the instigators
will deal with others only on specific trade terms.13 2 Therefore, a con-
certed agreement becomes a boycott only when the actors refuse to deal
beyond the given transaction, thereby using "unrelated transactions... as
leverage to achieve the terms desired" on the initial transaction. 133
Writing for a minority of the Court on this point, Justice Souter
joined byjustices White, Blackmun, and Stevens) provided an alternative
definition of boycott.' 3 4 Instead of focusing, as the majority does, on
126. Id. at 2911. See footnote 7 for one count in the complaint that was dismissed
for fuilure to allege a boycott. Id. at 2917. This Court alleged that some domestic pri-
mary insurers conspired with foreign reinsurers and the ISO to draft restrictive form
and policy language for retrocessional insurance. Id. at 2906 n.18. Because the com-
plaint, however, did not allege that defendants "refused to deal" in connection with
drafting these forms and policies, the Court found insufficient evidence of a boycott.
Id.
127. Id. at 2911. In 1880, an Irish organization, the Land League, requested a reduc-
tion of rents by landlords. Id. When Captain Charles Boycott, a manager of real estate
in Ireland refused to comply with the request, his tenants and "the population of the
region for miles around resolved not to have anything to do with him, and.., not to
allow anyone else to have anything to do with him .... No one would work for him; no
one would supply him with food." Id.
128. Id.
129. Justice Scalia described a conditional boycott (where the refusal to deal with the
target may be conditioned upon a promise to renew dealings if and when the target
mends its ways) and a partial boycott (where the target is isolated in part, but not
wholly, from certain transactions). Id.
130. I.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. I.
134. Although the minority and majority have different conceptions of what types of
behavior make a boycott effective, both sides agree that the following four elements
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refusals to deal with the target that are "collateral" or "unrelated" to the
objective sought by the boycott, Justice Souter focused on any "'enforce-
ment activities' that would raise the claimed attempts to fix terms to the
level of section 3(b) boycotts."1 5 Thus, Justice Souter's definition would
permit a finding of boycott even in a case involving a single transaction so
long as the concerted activity coerced others to comply with a specific
objective.
E. The International Comity Issue in Hartford
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter (joined by Justices Rehnquist,
White, Blackmun, and Stevens) affirmed the appellate court's decision
that international comity does not bar the exercise of extraterritorialjuris-
diction under the Sherman Act.' 36 The Court determined that subject
matter jurisdiction existed since the London reinsurers themselves con-
ceded this point and, also, because the alleged conduct of the reinsurers
produced a "substantial effect" in the United States, thus satisfying the
FTAIAjurisdictional requirement.'3 7
Having established subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act, the Court then found that "Congress expressed no view on the ques-
tion whether a court with Sherman Actjurisdiction should ever decline to
exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international comity" when it
enacted the FTAIA. 138 Even assuming, however, that a court could
decline to exercise jurisdiction in certain cases, the Supreme Court
decided that this was not such a case. l3 9 The appellate court had applied
the Timberlane test and found that all factors but one supported exercising
jurisdiction in this case. 14° The one exception was whether a conflict
existed between domestic and foreign law.141 The Supreme Court failed
to discuss the other factors, apparently accepting the appellate court's
analysis of them, but it briefly addressed the conflict factor and found that
no conflict existed between British and American law. Justice Souter rea-
soned that no conflict existed in this case because the foreign reinsurers
could comply with the laws of both England and the United States.142
characterize § 3(b) boycotts. Id. at 2903. First, "only those refusals to deal involving the
coordinated action of multiple actors" constitute § 3(b) boycotts. Id. Second, a § 3(b)
boycott need not involve an absolute refusal to deal or, in other words, a refusal to deal
can be conditional. Id. at 2903-04, 2912. Third, a § 3(b) boycott "need not entail une-
qual treatment of the targets of the boycott and its instigators." Id. at 2904. For exam-
ple, instigators of a boycott may treat all insurers equally by inviting them all to join the
boycott or else be subjected to it. Id. Fourth, "concerted activity" is not by itself a
boycott, although it is a necessary aspect of any boycott. I&
135. Id. at 2905.
136. Id. at 2908.
137. Id. at 2909.
138. Id. at 2910.
139. Id.
140. 938 F.2d at 934.
141. Id.
142. 113 S.Ct. at 2910.
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By contrastJustice Scalia (joined byJustices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas) dissented, arguing that the exercise of jurisdiction in this case
would be unreasonable. 143 The minority's approach focused on a distinc-
tion between "adjudicative comity," which would allow judges to decline
the exercise ofjurisdiction even though it exists, and "prescriptive comity,"
which would limit the substantive reach of U.S. laws abroad. 1 " Whereas
the majority apparently utilized the former, Justice Scalia argued that
courts must look solely at the statute itself to determine if jurisdiction
exists, and any comity considerations should be included in that determi-
nation. 145 In applying this test, the minority relied on the international
comity factors listed in section 403(2) of the Restatement (Third) of For-
eign Relations Law (codifying the Timberlane factors)14 6 to determine that
British interests outweighed those of the United States since the activity
involved British parties and occurred in Britain, where British laws regu-
late the London reinsurance market. 147 Justice Scalia criticized the major-
ity for focusing on the conflicts of law question in deciding whether to
abstain from exercising jurisdiction instead of considering the substantive
question of whether the Sherman Act covers the reinsurers' conduct.
148
M. Analysis
A. Limiting The Scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act Through the
Requirement of State Regulation
The Supreme Court's distinction between an entity-based and an activity-
based state regulation elicits two criticisms. First, by not realizing that
activities of insurers are inseparable from the entities themselves, the
Supreme Court failed to consider the inherent difficulty of regulating
activities occurring abroad. Second, the Supreme Court remanded,
instead of deciding, the difficult question of whether states regulate the
activity of foreign reinsurers.
1. Activity v. Entity-Based State Regulation
The trend prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hartford was to limit
the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' 49 Given the recent debate over
the value of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Supreme Court should have
followed this trend by limiting the scope of section 2 (b) to those activities
occurring within the states' lborders. In fact, the appellate court favored
such an entity-based approach by arguing that states can only regulate
143. Id. at 2921.
144. Id. at 2920.
145. Id. at 2919-20.
146. Justice Scalia asserted that the result would be the same under any system of
evaluating international choice-of-law issues, including Timberlane Id.
147. Id. at 2921.
148. Id.
149. See supra parts IA. & B. See also Recent Case, Antitrust McCarran-Ferguson Immu-
nity-Ninth Circuit Binds Reinsurers Potentially Liable for Involvement in Developing Standard-
ized Policies, 105 I1uv. L. REv. 1414 (1992).
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activity occurring within their borders. 15 0 Claiming that one state cannot
regulate acts occurring within another state, the appellate court con-
cluded that states similarly could not regulate activity occurring in foreign
countries.151
Furthermore, the appellate court cited Royal Drug for the proposition
that "an exempt entity forfeits [its] antitrust exemption by acting in con-
cert with non-exempt parties."15 2 The Supreme Court, however, rejected
this analysis, claiming that the appellate court misinterpreted the analogy
made in Royal Drugbetween the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the Capper-
Volstead Act.153 The Court claimed that the analogy was a "loose" one
because the McCarran-Ferguson Act immunizes activities not persons,
whereas the Capper-Volstead Act immunizes persons.15 4
Although the Supreme Court properly distinguished RoyalDrug it did
not consider the possibility that an entity-based and an activity-based inter-
pretation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act are not mutually exclusive. The
Supreme Court could have limited the scope of the Act by applying an
entity-based approach to foreign insurers while at the same time retaining
an activity-based definition for domestic insurers. However, the Supreme
Court probably decided against developing such a dichotomy in analyzing
§ 2(b) of the Act so as not to disrupt the manner in which domestic insur-
ers conduct business with foreign reinsurers.155 Still, an entity-based
approach might have improved state regulation of the international insur-
ance business by encouraging domestic insurers to transact their business
in the United States when dealing with foreign reinsurers, or instead it
might have encouraged domestic insurers to transact more business with
domestic reinsurers. 156
2. The Quality of State Regulation
The second criticism of the Supreme Court's decision is its failure to assess
the extent to which states regulate foreign reinsurers. Under current pre-
cedent, states satisfy the regulation requirement of section 2(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act so long as they provide a minimal regulatory
150. 938 F.2d at 928.
151. The appellate court believed that state insurance schemes "could not purport to
regulate the bulk of international insurance transactions." Id. (citingJ. ATWOOD & K.
BRawsT, ANTrrrusT AN AMEICAN Busn mSS ABRoAD 1, 78 (1981)).
152. Id. (citing Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. 205, 231
(1979)).
153. 113 S. Ct. at 2902.
154. The Capper-Volstead Act immunizes agricultural cooperatives from antitrust lia-
bility under the Sherman Act. Donald A. Frederick, Legal Rights of Producers to Collectively
Negotiate, 9 WM. Mrrc-ELm L. REv. 433 (1993). To qualify for Capper-Volstead protec-
tion, members of a cooperative must be producers of agricultural products. Id. These
producers include "farmers, planters, ranchers, dairymen, and nut or fruit growers." Id.
Unlike the McCarran-Ferguson Act which immunizes activities of insurers, the Capper-
Volstead Act immunizes individuals. Therefore, the Supreme Court rejected the appel-
late court's reasoning derived from a "loose analogy" drawn between the two Acts in
RoyalDrug. 113 S. Ct. at 2902.
155. Miller, supra note 51.
156. Id.
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scheme. 15 7 It is unclear, however, whether most states would satisfy even
this minimal requirement with regard to regulating foreign reinsurers.
Most states provide limited regulation of reinsurers even when the rein-
surer's activity occurs within the United States. 158 States primarily regu-
late the solvency of foreign reinsurers, albeit indirectly, through domestic
insurers who receive "credit for reinsurance" on their financial statements
upon showing that their reinsurer meets the minimum standards for
solvency.159
Although states may regulate the solvency of foreign reinsurers, they
often do not regulate the type of insurance coverage provided by these
reinsurers for several reasons. First, reinsurance agreements involve
sophisticated business parties capable of protecting their own interests.160
Second, reinsurance agreements are generally not contracts of adhesion,
but rather are tailored to meet the specific needs of the parties involved,
and therefore should not be hindered by rigid regulatory require-
ments.1 61 Third, it is impractical for states to regulate the diverse policies
produced by reinsurers requiring flexibility to change their agreements to
reflect rapid changes in the market.16 2 Thus, the states do not regulate
the substance of reinsurance coverage as extensively as they regulate
domestic insurance policies provided directly to consumers.
Given the complex nature of international transactions, courts should
apply a higher standard of state regulation to foreign reinsurers under
section 2(b). The minimal standard currently applied to domestic insur-
ers would not adequately protect U.S. consumers from antitrust activities
occurring abroad, such as the alleged "London Market Agreement" in
which foreign reinsurers agreed to insure only those policies that
excluded pollution coverage. 16 3 Thus, by failing to decide whether states
satisfy the section 2(b) regulation requirement of the McCarran-Ferguson
157. See supra note 37 and accompanying discussion of the state regulation require-
ment under § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
158. Second Interim Report on U.S. Government Efforts to Combat Fraud and
Abuse in the Insurance Industry. Problems With the Regulation of the Insurance and
Reinsurance Industry, S. REP. No. 310, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. 26 (1992). The report
states:
The offshore reinsurance industry is grossly unregulated by the current U.S.
regulatory system.... Clearly, State attempts at regulation, even to the extent
they exist, are inherently inadequate. Even if it had the resources to do so, a
State insurance commission lacks the jurisdiction to pursue these alien reinsur-
ers and their unlicensed brokers. Each insurance commission cannot possibly
investigate the type of vast interstate and international networking and money
flow that the Subcommittee found in its investigation.
159. GRAYDON S. STAirNo, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE §§ 3:1, 5:5 (1993).
160. Charles W. Havens IlI & Rita M. Theisen, The Application of United States and EEC
Antitrust Laws to Reinsurance and Insurance Pooling Arrangements, 54 A~mrmusr LJ. 1299
(1985).
161. John S. Butler, Legal Nature & Types of Reinsurance, in LAw AND PRA C7I1 OF
INTERNATiONAL REImSURANcE CoI.CrToNs AND INsoLvENcY 31 (1988).
162. Id.
163. See supra note 158 (quoting a Senate Report concluding that states lack the
resources to investigate adequately international reinsurance transactions).
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Act, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to limit the scope of the
Act as it applies to foreign reinsurers.
B. Redefining the Term "Boycott"
A proper definition of the term "boycott" as used in section 3(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act should reflect the purpose of the Act, as well as
the special nature of the insurance industry.16 Congress passed the Act
intending to protect certain types of collective activity necessary for the
proper functioning of the insurance business. 1' Both lower courts ana-
lyzed the boycott issue in light of the protection intended by the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act. The district court concluded that the defendant
insurers' activity consisted of "collective development of terms for policies"
which the McCarran-Ferguson Act intended to protect.1 6 6 The appellate
court, however, decided that the defendants' concerted activity had "gone
beyond joint action to their own regulation of the terms on which CGL
and property insurance will be offered" and that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act did not protect such activity.167
Unlike the lower courts, the Supreme Court failed to define the term
"boycott" in light of the legislative purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Instead, Justice Scalia derived his definition of boycott from its historical
roots without considering the special nature of the insurance industry or
judicial precedent interpreting the term "boycott." The Supreme Court
had previously construed the boycott exemption in St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Bary stating that "[t]he generic concept of boycott refers to a
method of pressuring a party with whom one has a dispute by withholding,
or enlisting others to withhold, patronage or services from the target."1' 8
The activity in Bary constituted a boycott because competing insurers had
agreed not to deal with the plaintiff policyholders on any terms.1 69 The
Barry definition of boycott, however, failed to consider that a boycott may
include not only "a concerted refusal to deal on any terms, but also a
164. Note, Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company: A R-Interpretation of the
Boycott Exception to the McCarran Act, 1977 DuKE L REv. 1069, 1083.
165. Id. at 1077.
166. The district court stated:
What the McCarran Act leaves unprotected is conduct which goes beyond the
making and implementation of agreements to do business only on terms
acceptable to the participant (even if such agreements would otherwise violate
Section 1), such as refusals to deal on any terms and exclusion from alternative
sources. Such conduct is not charged here.
723 F. Supp. at 479.
167. Although conceding that cooperation among insurers, "including those who
might be unwilling to agree were it not for economic exigencies," may be immune
under the Act, the appellate court determined that such cooperation becomes a boy-
cott when the "'economic exigencies' are produced by conspirators who refuse to sup-
ply reinsurance if the unwilling insurer does not agree." 938 F.2d 919, 930. See also
News & Analysis, Oral Arguments Heard From British Reinsurance Indusy On Forfeiture of
Antitrust Immunity, U.S. LAw WEEK, Feb. 26, 1993.
168. 438 U.S. at 541.
169. Id. at 552.
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refusal to deal except on certain terms."170
The Supreme Court confronted this possibility in Hartford The Court
reasoned that a refusal to deal except on certain terms may constitute a
boycott under certain conditions. The majority and minority, however,
disagreed about the conditions necessary to transform a "concerted
refusal" to deal, except on certain terms, into a boycott.17 1 The majority
defined these conditions in terms of unrelated, collateral transactions
while the minority focused on "enforcement activity."17
2
Under the majority's definition, foreign reinsurers could collectively
refuse to reinsure CGL forms that they did not approve because "the terms
of the primary coverages are central elements of the reinsurance con-
tract."173 By characterizing the interdependent relationship between pri-
mary insurers and foreign reinsurers as a single transaction, Justice Scalia
concluded that the foreign reinsurers' refusal to deal under these condi-
tions did not involve a collateral transaction. 174 Their activity thus did not
constitute a boycott.175 Justice Scalia conceded, however, that the foreign
reinsurers' actions may establish a boycott under different conditions. For
example, a boycott would exist if the foreign reinsurers "refused all rein-
surance, even as to risks written on other forms" which they approved.176
Also, a boycott would occur if the foreign reinsurers "linked their
demands" so as to refuse reinsurance for some policies until their terms
were met on other insurance policies. 177
By contrast, the minority's definition of boycott relies on the prece-
dent in Barry. In Barry, the Supreme Court had decided that the term
"boycott" did not describe a "unitary phenomenon," but rather depended
on the facts of the case.178 Similarly, the minority in Hartford relied on the
fact-specific "enforcement activity" standard to argue that the interests of
insurers and reinsurers are not always inseparable. 179 Justice Souter
assumed that foreign reinsurers would ordinarily act independently to
serve their best business interests. In Hartford, however, the reinsurers'
refusal to provide reinsurance represented the interests of the domestic
insurers seeking to coerce their competitors to accept their terms on the
ISO forms. Thus, underJustice Souter's definition, the foreign reinsurers'
conduct established a boycott because it enforced the goals of the domes-
tic insurers.
Under the majority's definition of boycott, however, the foreign rein-
surers would be immune in these circumstances so long as they had some
170. Joseph E. Coughlin, Losing McCarran Act Protection Through "Boycott, Coeron, or
Intimidation," 54 ANrusr L.J. 1281, 1287 (1985).
171. 113 S. Ct. at 2912-13.
172. I& at 2904, 2912-13.
173. Id at 2914.
174. Id,
175. Id. at 2915.
176. Id. at 2916.
177. Id. at 2916-17.
178. 438 U.S. at 543.
179. 113 S. Ct. at 2907.
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motive for their involvement in the transaction with the primary insurers.
The minority's definition provides a more reasonable approach for deter-
mining when a boycott exists. This definition permits the courts to delve
beyond the facial justifications of the defendants' conduct to decide if, in
fact, this conduct is the type that the McCarran-Ferguson Act intended to
protect.18 0 In addition to considering the purpose of the Act, the minor-
ity's broader definition of boycott also limits the scope of the Act's immu-
nity, a trend established in Barry which the majority failed to acknowledge.
Given the tension between the majority and minority definitions of
boycott in this five-to-four decision, Hartford may not provide stable prece-
dential value in the long run. Perhaps, the struggle between the two sides
should "serve as a serious wake-up call to Congress that America needs to
deal with the McCarran-Ferguson Act's excessive antitrust exemption."' 18
Until Congress responds to Hartford, however, the majority's "overly nar-
row" definition presents a difficult standard for the states to meet on
remand.'8 2 It is not clear whether the states can satisfy the Hartford stan-
dard by showing that the foreign reinsurers exercised a "kind of extrane-
ous second-transaction muscle."18 3
Assuming the states cannot satisfy the new "boycott" standard, their
best strategy may be to prove that the defendants' conduct amounted to
"coercion and intimidation" under section 3 (b) of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.'8 4 Although Justice Scalia dismissed this possibility without much
explanation in his opinion,'8 5 the lower courts may be convinced by such
arguments since the threshold for establishing coercion or intimidation
may be lower than the standard for proving a boycott. Additionally, the
plaintiff states may shift their focus to the section 3(b) language which
prohibits an "agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate." Given the evi-
dence of the "London Market Agreement," the states may have less diffi-
culty establishing an "agreement" under section 3(b) than an actual
"boycott." Thus, the Supreme Court may have left open some possibilities
for limiting the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's exemption from
the federal antitrust laws.
180. Charles D. Weller, The "New" McCarran-Ferguson Act Antitrust Exemption After
Barry, 50 INs. CouNs. J. 29 (1983) (noting that the Bany definition of boycott reflects
the purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
181. Supreme Court Rues States Can Sue Insurers Over Boycott, LAmrrWE, Vol. 8, No.
27, July 5, 1993.
182. Roy T. Englert, Jr., Trusts and the Judiciay: A Separate Tide AfLer Drifling From
"Chicago School" Theories of Market Efficienc, the Supreme Court Returns Defendants to its
Favor, THa REcoRDER, Sept. 1, 1993, at 9.
183. Henry Gottlieb, High Court Gives Go Ahead for Foreign Antitrust Suit ButJustices Set
Standards That Make Vctory a Longshot, CoNN. L. Tm., July 5, 1993, at 17.
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b).
185. 113 S. Ct. at 2915 n.6 (Justice Scalia concluded that a concerted agreement to
terms did not coerce anyone in the usual sense of the word).
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C. Rejecting the International Comity Balancing Test
Although the court properly decided the international comity issue, the
majority's opinion was primarily fact-based and failed to resolve three
important legal issues. First, the Supreme Court failed to determine
whether the "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" stan-
dard of the FTAIA amends the existing "effects test" or merely codifies
it.1 86 Second, the Court did not decide whether, under the FTAIA,judges
still have the authority to decline jurisdiction due to comity considera-
tions.18 7 Third, even if comity is still a valid doctrine in the antitrust con-
text, the Court seemed to ignore the dissent's focus on the type of comity
utilized (prescriptive or adjudicative). In other words, the Court did not
settle whether the international comity balancing test should be applied in
determining whether jurisdiction exists in the first place or whether it
should be applied only after jurisdiction has been established.188
By focusing on the specific facts of the case, the Supreme Court in
Hartford failed to formulate a clear legal standard for lower courts to follow
in cases that involve strong foreign interests. It is unclear how much of the
Timberlane analysis survives the Court's decision. The lower courts may
now focus primarily or exclusively on the majority's lenient test of a "true
conflict" among nations.18 9 Also, the Supreme Court failed to guide lower
courts in deciding cases where, unlike Hartford, the facts do not over-
whelmingly favor the extraterritorial application of the law.
In addition to these flaws with the Supreme Court's decision in Hart-
ford, the international comity balancing test is also inherently flawed. Gen-
erally, the comity test produces highly discretionary and unpredictable
outcomes in cases.190 This is evident in Hartford where the lower courts
and the Supreme Court came to different conclusions by relying on the
same Timberlane factors. For example, the lower courts in Hartford
186. 113 S. Ct. at 2909 n.23 (the Court decided it was not necessary to resolve this
issue because even assuming that FTAIA affects this case and also that the FTAIA differs
from prior law, the alleged conduct satisfied the FTAIA's requirements).
187. Id.
188. The Supreme Court failed to resolve the tension between the lower court deci-
sions in Alcoa and Mannington Mills (which distinguished whether jurisdiction exists.
from whether a court should exercise it) and Timberlane (which combined the comity
analysis with the jurisdictional question). 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2910 n.24. However, this
tension may have little practical significance. Ultimately, the majority and minority
both apply the Timberlane factors after determining that the Sherman Act applies extra-
territorially. Id. at 2910, 2920. They merely disagree as to the outcome of applying
those factors to the facts of this case. The dispute over the theoretical placement of the
comity test does not appear to affect this result, and it is difficult to imagine a situation
where it would.
189. See 113 S. Ct. at 2921-22 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Cf James M. Grippando, Declin-
ing to Exerdse Extateritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction on Grounds of International Comity: An
Illegitimate Extension of the Judicial Abstention Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 395, 421 (1983)(advocating a choice of law interpretation of Timberane); Mladen Don Kresic, The Incon-
venient Forum and International Comity In Private Antitrust Actions, 52 FoRDHAM L. REv. 399
(1983) (suggesting that forum non conveniens is a preferable jurisdictional alternative
to comity analysis).
190. Kadish, supra note 83, at 156.
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decided that the "degree of conflict with foreign law or policy" was great
since Britain regulates the reinsurance market91' and also because British
laws protect antitrust defendants against punitive damages.192 Yet, under
these same facts, the Supreme Court found that no conflict existed
because the foreign reinsurers could comply with both British and U.S.
laws.' 93
Another criticism of the comity test is that it requires the courts to
make policy decisions about (1) the degree of conflict with foreign law,
(2) the extent to which enforcement of the judgment will achieve compli-
ance; and (3) the possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exer-
cises jurisdiction. 94 Often the courts are not well-suited for resolving
such non-justiciable political issues.195 For example, the courts did not
predict the backlash that ensued from the Uranium Antitrust decision
which motivated the passage of foreign retaliatory "blocking statutes." 196
These laws threaten diplomatic relations between the United States and
other nations. Because of this threat the courts should not be using the
balancing test in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners.
One solution to the problem of foreign retaliation against the extra-
territorial application of U.S. antitrust laws may be to permit the executive
branch to intervene before prosecutors file a suit. This would allow the
executive branch to resolve any potential international conflict through
diplomatic channels. For example, the United States has developed diplo-
matic agreements with Australia,197 Canada,' 98 and the EEC19 9 to facili-
191. The district court found that the British Department of Trade and Industry reg-
ulates the marketplace through various acts, including the Uoyd's Acts (1870-1982), the
Companies Act (1985), and the Insurance Companies Act (1982), and that these British
laws exempt agreements among insurers, reinsurers, and retrocessional insurers about
provisions in insurance policies from antitrust regulation. 723 F. Supp. 464, 488.
192. The district court cited Britain's "unmitigated hostility to the extraterritorial
application of American antitrust laws" as evidenced in England's passage of the Protec-
tion of Trading Interests Act (1980), a blocking statute that permits British antitrust
defendants to recover from plaintiffs the punitive portion of a damage judgment stem-
ming from activities that occurred outside the enforcing nation's territory. Id.
193. 113 S. Ct. at 2910.
194. Michael Tepass, Resolving Extraterritoriality Gmflicts in Antitrust" Two Case Studies
and Proposals of Solution, 5 CONN. J. IThr'L L., 565, 592 (1990).
195. Id.
196. Carl A. Cira, Jr., The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions,
18 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 247 (1982). In response to the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust laws, Britain enacted the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 to retal-
iate against the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. Id. at 249. Similarly,
the Australian Parliament enacted the Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of
Enforcement) Act 1979. Id. at 254 n.41. These Acts, called blocking statutes, generally
achieve two purposes. Id. at 253. One purpose is to prevent compliance with foreign
state requests for documents or information required for evidentiary purposes during
discovery or the trial. Id. The other purpose is to prevent the enforcement in whole, or
in part, of decisions issued by foreign courts, particularly the punitive or treble damages
portion of U.S. antitrust judgments. Id. at 254.
197. James W. King, US-Australia Antitrst Agreemen 13 GAJ. INT'L & COMi'. L. 49, 52
n.16 (1983) (citing Agreement Relating to Cogeneration on Antitrust Matters,June 29,
1982, United States-Australia, 21 I.LM. 702).
198. Id. at 66 n.75.
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tate cooperation in antitrust matters. These agreements generally provide
for (1) future consultations to avoid potential conflicts among nations; (2)
notification prior to the initiation of an antitrust suit affecting the other
nation's interests; and (3) exchange of information about activities affect-
ing international trade.2°°
Despite the problems with the comity analysis, it serves the limited
purpose of eliminating from judicial consideration those antitrust cases
that have only slight economic impact on the U.S. economy but involve
strong foreign interests.
In practice, the American courts focus on the extent to which there is a
direct and substantial effect on American commerce; United States courts
declining or asserting jurisdiction is not a result of a balancing process but
of the extent of an effect on the United States commerce. The balancing
process excludes only conduct with de minimis effects on American com-
merce. This result has already been achieved by the traditional effects
test.201
Arguably, the comity balancing test does nothing more than sensitize the
courts to the competing interests of foreign nations. The test provides no
meaningful method to assimilate these foreign interests beyond acknowl-
edging their existence. 20 2 Perhaps, then, the best approach for the
Supreme Court in Hartford would have been to reject the Timberlane
approach in favor of a pure "effects" test for subject matterjurisdiction. If
the foreign conduct has only a limited effect on the United States, then
courts could apply a "mild" comity balancing test to limit jurisdiction in
these extreme cases.203 As other countries develop more sophisticated
forms of economic regulation, the courts will need to defer to their judg-
ment on the most effective way to promote free trade on an international
level.2 04
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Hartford has important implications for
the international insurance industry. The Court determined that domes-
tic insurers do not lose their McCarran-Ferguson immunity from antitrust
laws when they transact business with foreign reinsurers. The Court rea-
199. Donald L. Baker, Cooperation in the Interest of Competition, TFx. LAw., June 22,
1992; Neal Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, No Isolationism in the 1990's, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 19,
1991 (citing the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their
Competition Laws, repinted in 61 ANrrrausr & TRADE REG. REiP. (BNA) 382).
200. Id.
201. Tepass, supra note 194, at 601.
202. Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Federal Courts and Extraterritorial Antitrust Law:
Enlightened Self-Interest of Yankee Imperialism?, 5 J.L. CoM. 415, 421-22 (1985) (arguing
that courts should refer comity analysis to an ad hoc international panel of experts).
203. Barry E. Hawk, The InternationalApplication of the Sherman Act in Its Second Century,
59 Aiernrrusr LJ. 161, 169 (1990).
204. Coyle, supra note 116. See also Timothy L. Andersson, xtraterritorial Application
of National Antitrust laws: The Need for More Uniform Regulation, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 579
(1992) (proposing the development of an international antitrust code).
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soned that the Act protects the "activities" of insurers not the insurance
"entities" themselves. Therefore, the McCarran-Ferguson Act protects for-
eign reinsurers under section 2(b) so long as the states regulate their
activities.
At first glance, the Court's interpretation of the scope of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act presents a victory for domestic insurers who regularly
conduct business transactions with foreign reinsurers. In reality, however,
this victory may be hollow because the states generally do not regulate the
activities of foreign reinsurers, particularly those activities occurring
outside the states' borders. Therefore, such international transactions will
not be protected under the state regulation requirement of section 2(b) of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. A better approach would have been for the
Supreme Court to follow the previous trend of limiting the Act's scope by
requiring that international transactions be conducted within the jurisdic-
tion of the various states which must regulate such transactions under sec-
tion 2(b).
Additionally, the Court reassessed the meaning of the term "boycott"
under section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In a five to four deci-
sion, the Court provided a narrower definition of boycott which will prob-
ably allow a wide array of anticompetitive practices to be exempt from the
federal antitrust laws. A better approach would have been for the
Supreme Court to limit the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act by pro-
viding a broader definition of boycott thereby minimizing the section 3(b)
exemption from federal antitrust laws. Instead, under the new boycott
standard, the suing states on remand will have greater difficulty proving a
boycott. Their best strategy may be to focus on proving that the defend-
ants' conduct constituted "intimidation" or "coercion" in violation of sec-
tion 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Lastly, the Court indirectly endorsed a comity analysis for determin-
ing when to apply U.S. antitrust laws extraterritorially. The Court focused
on one aspect of the comity analysis in particular-the potential conflict
between U.S. and foreign laws-to determine that foreign interests did
not favor a refusal to exercise jurisdiction over the foreign defendants in
this case. Although the Court implicitly endorsed the comity approach, it
failed to provide any guidance to the lower courts about when to apply this
comity analysis. Given the non-justifiable diameter of the comity test and
the highly discretionary results produced by its application, the Supreme
Court should have rejected the comity test altogether in favor of a pure
"effects" test for determining jurisdiction.

